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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Voting-Equal

Protection-PRISONERS'

RIGHTS

To

VOTE

BY

ABSENTEE BALLOT OR SPECIAL PROCEDURES

O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974)
.During 1973, the United States Supreme Court cautiously
reconsidered the constitutionality of state election laws that deny
absentee voting and registration privileges to persons who are
confined in penal institutions but who are otherwise qualified to
vote. The prevailing view, established in 1969 by McDonald v. Board
of Elections,' had been that a state could deny unconvicted 'detainees
absentee registration forms and ballots. 2 In the 1973 case of Goosby
v. Osser,3 however, the Court undermined that view by ordering the
review of unconvicted detainees' constitutional claims.which alleged
not only exclusion from the state's absentee voting statute as in
McDonald, but also that the state failed to provide them with any
alternative means by which to vote. 4 Most recently, in O'Brien v.
394 U.S. 802 (1969).
In McDonald, the Illinois absentee registration and balloting law (ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch.
46, §§ 19-1 to -3 (Supp. 1974)), which the state had construed to exclude unconvicted
detainees, was held not violative of the equal protection clause. The McDonald Court,
however, expressly distinguished the situation in which prisoners establish that they are
absolutely precluded from voting: "[T]here is nothing in the record to indicate that the
Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on [prisoners'] ability to exercise the fundamental
right to vote." 394 U.S. at 807. The Court further stated that the
[a~ppellants agree that the record is barren of any indication that the State might
not, for instance, possibly furnish the jails with special polling booths or facilities on
election day, or provide guarded transportation to the polls themselves for certain
inmates, or entertain motions for temporary reductions in bail to allow some
inmates to get to the polls on their own.
Id. at 808 n.6.
' 409 U.S. 512 (1973).
In holding that the prisoners had presented a "substantial constitutional claim" for
purposes of requiring a three-judge court to hear the case, the Goosby opinion distinguished
McDonald:
Petitioners' constitutional challenges to the Pennsylvania scheme are in sharp
contrast. Petitioners allege that, unlike the appellants in McDonald, the Pennsylvania
statutory scheme absolutely prohibits them from voting, both because a specific
provision affirmatively excludes "persons confined in a penal institution" from
- voting by absentee ballot, and because requests by members of petitioners' class to
register and to vote either by absentee ballot, or by personal or proxy appearance at
polling places outside the prison, or at polling booths and registration facilities set
up at the prisons, or generally by any means satisfactory to the election officials, had
been denied. Thus, petitioners' complaint alleges a situation that McDonald itself
suggested might make a different case.
This is not to say, of course, that petitioners are as a matter of law entitled to
the relief sought. We neither decide nor intimate any view upon the merits.
Id. at 521-22 (footnotes and citation omitted). See generally 52 B.U.L. REv. 641, 641-46
(1972).
2
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Skinner,5 the Court, adjudicating the constitutional question left
unanswered by Goosby, held that New York's construction of its
absentee voting statutes6 to exclude unconvicted detainees and
imprisoned misdemeanants, all of whom were otherwise qualified
to vote, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
The Supreme Court divided sharply on the rationale for its
holding, however, suggesting a retreat from the past decade's
8
broadened federal protection of voting7 and prisoners' rights.
1
FROM PRISON TO POLLING PLACE

On October 10, 1972, seventy-two prisoners at New York's

Monroe County jail, including pretrial detainees and misdemeanants serving sentences, requested the County Commissioners of
Elections to provide the necessary application forms for absentee
registration and ballots for the November 7, 1972, general
electionsf The Commissipners refused.'0 Previous requests to pro5 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
6 The term "voting," as used here, refers to both registering to vote and casting a ballot
in general elections. "Balloting" is assigned the narrow meaning of casting a ballot.
The New York absentee registration statute at the time of O'Brien permitted a qualified
voter to register by absentee procedures only if he was confined at home, in a hospital, or in
an institution "because of illness or physical disability," or if his "duties, occupation or
business" required that he be outside the county of his residence on the days designated for
personal registration. N.Y. ELECTION LAw § 153-a(l) (McKinney Supp. 1972). Absentee
balloting was permitted if a qualified voter was confined in a veteran's hospital or away from
his residence on vacation on election day. Id. §§ 117(1)(a), (c).
7 The Warren Court plunged into the voting rights arena after removing the "political
questions" bar to judicial review of legislative apportionment in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962). Since Baker, the Court has decided numerous voting rights cases and framed a
patchwork of constitutional law on the right to vote. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text
infra.
8 Although the Warren Court vigorously protected the rights of the accused (see, e.g.,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), increased judicial protection of prisoners' rights
was left to the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala.
1966), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). See generally Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional
Law and the Awareness of the Rights of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REV. 669 (1966); Hollen,
Emerging Prisoners' Rights, 33 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1972); Comment, Prisoners'Rights and Equal
Protection, 29 AM. U.L. REv. 482 (1971); Syvnposium-Prisoners' Rights and the Correctional
Scheme: The Legal Controversy and Problems of Implementation, 16 VILL. L. REv. 1029 (1971).
9 The League of Women Voters represented the prisoners in requesting statutory
application forms. Brief for Appellants at 5-6, O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants]. After the Commissioners' refusal, the League,
with assistance from the county sheriff, distributed forms to the jail's population on which
the prisoners stated their names, residences, and desire to vote. Id. Some of the prisoners
were already registered and sought only a means for balloting.
10 The Commissioners based their refusal on a construction of the New York absentee
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vide mobile registration and balloting units in the jail or to transport the prisoners to appropriate registration facilities had also
been denied." The prisoners then petitioned for judicial review of
12
these administrative decisions in the state court.
Both the New York Supreme Court and Appellate Division
construed the absentee voting provisions as allowing petitioners to
register and vote by absentee means because they were under a
"physical disability" and therefore unable to appear personally.' 3
registration and balloting provisions that excluded unconvicted detainees and imprisoned
misdemeanants. Brief for Appellants at 5.
" The officials maintained that they had no specific duty to register the petitioners by
either of these alternative means, both of which allegedly involved "unreasonable" burdens.
Memorandum of Law for Respondent at 3, O'Brien v. Skinner, 40 App. Div. 2d 942, 337
N.Y.S.2d 700 (4th Dep't 1972).
,2 Petitioners brought a summary proceeding in the Supreme Court under N.Y. Civ.
PP.Ac. LAW § 7801 (McKinney 1963), and N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 331 (McKinney 1964).
Section 7801 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules permits a special proceeding
against an administrative agency or officer in the nature of a writ of mandamus. Section 331
of the New York Election Law permits a qualified voter who has been unlawfully denied
registration or application to vote to seek judicial compulsion of his registration or reception
of his vote.
In their petition and supporting affidavit, the plaintiffs alleged that they were residents
of Monroe County and were qualified voters. The Commissioners, however, charged that
under New York law they reserved the right to disqualify some of the prisoners because of
prior felony convictions. Brief for Appellants at 7; see N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 152(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1972). See also Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968) (upholding constitutionality of New York statute disenfranchising convicted felons).
,3 The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, granted relief to those prisoners who
had registered prior to confinement but dismissed the petition of those prisoners who had
not so registered. Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement at 21. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S.
524 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement]. The trial judge
concluded that the prisoners were entitled to register and cast their ballots in absentia,
stating that
[s]ince Election Law, § 330 requires [absentee voting] provisions to be construed
liberally, and because an inmate of a jail is under physical disability to present
himself at a polling place or at the central registration office, this court concludes
that petitioners are entitled to absentee registration upon complying with the
requirements of Election Law § 153-a, provided that they are not disenfranchised
by the provisions of Election Law, § 152 [disqualifying felons] and provided that
they make due and timely application for such registration.
Id. at 19-20. He also found, however, that the unregistered prisoners had not supplied the
required information before the absentee registration deadline. The justice criticized these
prisoners for not using the absentee application forms provided by the Board of Elections.
Id. at 20. The court apparently failed to realize, however, that the Board had refused to
make these forms available to the prisoners. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
Because Special Term dismissed the petition without prejudice to proper and timely
application for absentee ballots by the registered prisoners, the effect of its decision was to
allow absentee voting for those prisoners who had registered prior to confinement while
denying the voting right to those who had not previously registered.
The Appellate Division concluded that all the prisoners came within the statutory
provisions:

Section 117-a of the Election Law provides for absentee voting where a qualified
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However, the New York Court of Appeals, in a five to two decision,
reversed, and dismissed the petition. The majority summarily rejected all alternative proposals for "in person" voting1 4 and construed the election law to exclude prisoners from absentee registration and balloting privileges. 15 The court held that such a statutory
construction did not deprive the prisoners of equal protection of
the laws under the. fourteenth amendment.' 6 Within four days of
the 1972 general elections Justice Thurgood Marshall, sitting as
Circuit Justice, denied the petitioners' application for a stay of the
7
Court of Appeals' judgment.'
The Supreme Court heard the prisoners' appeal one year
later. Seven Justices concluded that the prisoners had been denied
equal protection of the law. Only three of the Justices voting to
voter may be unable to appear because of a physical disability. We believe that
petitioners being so confined, are physically disabled from voting and should be
permitted to do so by casting absentee ballots.
O'Brien v. Skinner, 40 App. Div. 2d 942, 337 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701 (4th Dep't 1972).
Accordingly, the intermediate court modified the lower court's judgment by ordering that
the Commissioners register the prisoners who were not registered but who were otherwise
qualified to vote and thereupon issue them absentee ballots. Id. Having found that the
prisoners had indicated their eligibility to register and to vote and their desire to do so by
absentee means within the lawful period, the Appellate Division rejected Special Term's
distinction between the application form described in the Election Law (§§ 153-a(4), 117-a(6)
(McKinney 1964)), and the request forms provided by the League of Women Voters.
The majority stated:
We reject out of hand any scheme which would commit respondents to a policy
of transporting such detainees to public polling places; would assign them the
responsibility of providing special voting facilities under such conditions, and in
view of the attendant difficulties; or, would threaten like hazards embraced by such
schema.
O'Brien v. Skinner, 31 N.Y.2d 317, 319, 291 N.E.2d 134, 135, 338 N.Y.S.2d 890, 892 (1972).
" Relying on the fact that an applicant for absentee voting was required to submit a
medical "certificate made by a duly licensed physician or by the medical superintendent or
administrative head of a hospital or institution," (N.Y. ELECTION LAw §§ 117-a(5), 153-a(5)
(McKinney 1964)), the majority concluded that the statutes included only persons "medically
disabled by reason of some malady or other physical impairment," and that "the fact of
confinement to a penal institution would not entitle a voter or registrant to avail himself of
the absentee provisions." 31 N.Y.2d at 319, 291 N.E.2d at 136, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
11 31 N.Y.2d at 319, 291 N.E.2d at 136, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 892. The dissenting judges
would have affirmed the lower court's ruling that the absentee voting provisions of the
election law include all otherwise qualified prisoners. Id. at 321, 291 N.E.2d at 137, 337
N.Y.S.2d at 894 (Fuld. C.J. & Burke, J. dissenting). Judge Burke commented that any
construction of the election law that precluded petitioners from voting would deny them
equal protection. Id.
17 O'Brien v. Skinner, 409 U.S. 1240 (1972). Justice Marshall commented favorably on
the merits of the petitioners' claim but refused to order a stay because of "compelling
practical considerations," e.g., the inability of state election officials to process registration
statements in the short time remaining before the election, petitioners' delay in seeking
absentee ballots, and a lack of information on the state courts' disposition of the case. Id. at
1241-42
.

-
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reverse based their decision on New York's unjustified denial of the
unconvicted detainees' and imprisoned misdemeanants' fundamental
right to vote.' 8 Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, base-d
reversal on a less sweeping rationale. His opinion held only that
allowing unconvicted detainees and imprisoned misdemeanants
who were confined outside the county of their residence to vote,
while denying the vote to appellants who were confined within the
county of their residence, was an arbitrary, unconstitutional
discrimination. 9 The dissenting Justices, on the other hand, concluded that this inequity was not of sufficient magnitude to be
considered a constitutional deprivation. °
II
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF PRISONERS' RIGHTS TO
EQUAL TREATMENT IN THE VOTING PROCESS

A.

Where the Court Stands After O'Brien v. Skinner

The sharp split of opinion in O'Brien underscores a subtle shift
in the Supreme Court's stance on judicial review of state action
regulating voting. During the past decade the Court has applied
one of two standards in reviewing equal protection challenges to
state action. 21 If the claimant establishes an infringement of a
"fundamental right"2 2 or discrimination based on a "suspect
classification, 2 3 the state must demonstrate a "compelling interest"
to justify its discriminatory action. Absent such an initial showing
by the claimant, he has the more difficult burden of proving that
the state action has no rational relation to any permissible state
objective. 4 The Burger Court's handling of recent voting rights
cases, however, demonstrates a gradual movement away from this
compelling state interest-rational relation dichotomy in the voting
rights area.
18 414 U.S. at 531 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Douglas concurred

in this opinion. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text infra.
19 414 U.S. at 530. Justices Powell, Stewart, and White concurred in Chief Justice
Burger's opinion. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text infra.
20 414 U.S. at 536 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined in this opinion.
See notes 47, 71-73 and accompanying text infra.
2' See generally San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-44 (1973).
22 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (equal right to vote); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation).
23 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (wealth); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 103 U.S. 303 (1880) (race).
24 See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
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In Dunn v. Blumstein 25 and in dicta in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,2 6 the present Court indicated that the
compelling state interest standard of review would apply when the
fundamental equal right to vote had been denied. Chief Justice
Burger dissented in Dunn, however, and condemned the compelling state interest standard as too rigorous.2 7 Soon thereafter in
Rosario v. Rockefeller,28 a divided Court circumvented the compelling state interest precedents and upheld a section of the New York
election law that limited voter eligibility for party primaries. Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, distinguished Dunn and expressly
limited application of the compelling state interest standard to
cases in which "the State totally denied the electoral franchise to a
particular class of residents. 2 9
25 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In a six to one decision, the majority applied the compelling
state interest standard and held that Tennessee's durational residency requirement was an
unconstitutional infringement of the fundamental rights of voting and interstate travel.
26 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Although the Court rejected the claim that the Texas funding
scheme for primary and secondary education violated the equal protection dause, both
Justice Powell's majority opinion (id. at 34 n.74) and Justice Marshall's dissent (id. at 101)
emphasized that the fourteenth amendment encompassed a fundamental right to vote on an
"equal basis with other citizens." See note 42 infra.
27 Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the "compelling state
interest" standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has
ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will,
for it demands nothing less than perfection.
405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972); cf. id. at 360 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (compelling state
interest standard questionable).
28 410 U.S. 752 (1973). The challenged statute required voters to enroll in the party of
their choice at least 30 days before the general election in order to be eligible to vote in the
next party primary.
29 Id. at 757. Instead of reiterating the rational relation test, however, Justice Stewart
questioned whether the enrollment cut-off date was "an arbitrary time limit unconnected to
any important state goal." Id. at 760. The majority concluded that the time period was not
arbitrary and that it had been legitimately adopted by the state to hinder party raiding.
Justices Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan joined in a dissent written by Justice Powell, who
had written the Rodriguez opinion handed down the same day. Powell criticized the majority
for ignoring the precedents and abandoning the compelling state interest standard:
The majority does not identify the standard of scrutiny it applies to the New
York statute. We are told only that the cutoff date is "not an arbitrary time limit
unconnected to any important state goal"; ...The Court does not explain why this
formulation was chosen, what precedents support it, or how and in what contexts it
is to be applied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave the lower courts
and state legislatures in doubt and confusion as to how we will approach future
significant burdens on the right to vote and to associate freely with the party of
one's choice.
Id. at 767.
The Court temporarily revived the compelling state interest standard in nullifying an
Illinois election law that prohibited a person from voting in the primary of one party if he
had voted in the primary of any other party within the preceding 23 months. Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 61 (1973). The holding rests solely, however, on the statute's
infringement of the right of free political association with the party of one's choice protected
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In O'Brien the unconvicted detainees and confined misdemeanants established that New York had totally precluded their
class from voting. Only the concurring Justices, however, followed
Dunn as limited by Rosario and applied the compelling state interest
standard. 30 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, abandoned
the compelling state interest-rational relation dichotomy and employed a more flexible, but undefined, standard of review. Although he never directly addressed the question of the proper
standard of review, he characterized the statutory construction of
the New York absentee voting provision as "wholly arbitrary" and
"an unconstitutionally onerous burden on the ... exercise of the
franchise. ' 31 It is also clear that the dissent rejected the application
of the compelling state interest standard.3 2 Consequently, even
though the Chief Justice was writing for only four members of the
Court, it is apparent that O'Brien represents a significant retrenchment in the voting rights area.
The retreat from application of the compelling state interest
standard in voting rights cases increases the possibilities for judicial
flexibility and restraint in future cases. It also allows the Court to
retreat from the sweeping rationale of existing precedents in the
voting rights area 33 and to reach some incongruous results. 3 4 Until
the parameters of the Court's position are outlined, however, the
results of future equal protection challenges to electoral regulations
may be less predictable than they were with the more precise tests
35
already developed under the compelling state interest standard.
by the first and fourteenth amendments. Although the Court cited Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972), the fundamental "equal right to vote" was never mentioned.
30 Citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), Justice Marshall applied the compelling state interest standard of review in O'Brien. He found the analogy between the absolute
predusion of the prisoners' rights to vote and express statutory disqualifications sufficient to
justify such review:
Denial of absentee registration and absentee ballots is effectively an absolute denial
of the franchise to these appellants.
It is well settled that "if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some
citizens and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest." It is this standard of
review which must be employed here.
414 U.S. at 533 (citations omitted).
31 Id. at 530 quoting Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760 (1973).
32 See note 94 infra.
3 Chief Justice Burger's opinion in O'Brien ignored all prior voting rights cases except
Rosario v. Rockefeller. He cited McDonald and Goosby only for the purpose of distinguishing
McDonald. See text accompanying notes 1-6 supra.
34 Cf. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 61 (1973) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
dissenting Justices concluded that the requirements for eligibility to vote in party primaries
in Kusper and Rosario could not be distinguished. In their view, the result turned only on
application of different standards of review.
'5 See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 767 (1973) (Powell J., dissenting); notes
83-84 and accompanying text infra.
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B.

Underl)ing Equal Protection Issues
Future litigants challenging or defending election laws under
the equal protection clause should realize that resolution of their
cases will depend on more than rigid application of court-made
rules governing the standard of review. The success of their equal
protection attacks may depend on how the following key issues are
framed and analyzed: (1) What are the nature and sources of the
alleged right denied? (2) What class or category of persons is
precluded from exercising the alleged right? (3) Precisely how has
and (4)
the state acted to deny or infringe exercise of the right? 36
What objectives support the state's discriminatory action?
1. Constitutional Underpinning of the Right To Vote
The Constitution does not expressly guarantee citizens the
right to vote. Several clauses and amendments do, however, establish various electoral requirements.3 7 Prior to 1962, federal elections were distinguished from state and local elections. The Supreme Court, although recognizing state authority to set voter
qualifications, had extended federal constitutional protection to the
right to vote for federal officers.3 8 The Court at the same time
Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972). Justice Marshall stated:
To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we look, in
essence, to three things: the character of the classification in question; the individual
interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in
support of the classification.
36

Id.

I 7 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (popular election of Representatives by electors must
satisfy qualifications set by states); id. art. I, § 4 (congressional control over time, manner,
and places for holding elections for Senators and Representatives); id. art II, § 1, cls. 1-3
(electoral college device for election of President and Vice-President); id. amend. XII
(presidential electors); id. amend. XIV, § 2 (apportionment of House of Representatives); id.
amend. XV (race improper criterion for voter qualification); id. amend. XVII (direct election
of Senators by electors satisfying qualifications set by states); id. amend. XIX (sex improper
criterion for voter qualification); id. amend. XXIII (presidential electors for District of
Columbia); id. amend. XXIV (poll tax prohibited); id. amend. XXVI (prohibition of age
qualifications for citizens eighteen years of age or older).
38 In a landmark case, Ex pare Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), the Court held that
the right to vote for a candidate for the House of Representatives was secured by Artide I,
§ 2 of the Constitution. In United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), the Court defined the
voting rights of "qualified voters" in federal elections as follows:
The right of the people to choose, whatever its appropriate constitutional limitations, where in other respects it is defined, and the mode of its exercise is prescribed
by state action in conformity to the Constitution, is a right established and guaranteed by the Constitution and hence is one secured by it to those citizens and
inhabitants of the state entitled to exercise the right. While, in a loose sense, the
right to vote for representatives in Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right
derived from the states, this statement is true only in the sense that the states are
authorized by the Constitution, to legislate on the subject as provided by § 2 of Art.
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adhered to the position that "the right to vote for the election of
state officers .. .is a right or privilege of state citizenship, not of
national citizenship. '3 9 However, after entering the arena of legislative apportionment in Baker v. Carr,4 0 the Court gradually expanded protection of the right to vote in all federal, state, and local
elections under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 4' Although no case has expressly held that an
individual's right to vote in a state election is a fundamental right
for purposes of the equal protection clause,4 2 state voter
I, to the extent that Congress has not restricted state action by the exerdse-of its
powers to regulate elections under § 4 and its more general power under Article I,
§ 8, clause 18 of the Constitution "to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers."
Id. at 314-15 (citations omitted). Thus, in federal elections state regulation is limited to
setting qualifications for voting, and the scope of that authority may be restricted by
congressional action under Article I, § 4 and the necessary and proper clause. Cf. Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Lassiter v. Northampton Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51
(1959). But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 154-213 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(voting a privilege of state citizenship). See generally Denno, Politics, the Constitution and the
Eighteen-Year-Old Vote, 35 ALBANY L. REv. 1, 6-14 (1970); Kirby, The ConstitutionalRight To
Vote, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 995, 1003-06 (1970).
39 Snowden v. Hughes, 32 1 U.S. 1, 7 (1944) (citation omitted).
Forty years earlier, the Court had declared that
the privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be
exercised as the State may direct, arid upon such terms as to it may seem proper,
provided, of course, no discrimination is made between individuals in violation of
the Federal Constitution.
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1904); cf.Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
40 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker, the Court merely removed the "political question"
obstacle to judicial review of state apportionment systems which discriminated against
persons living in more populous election districts. See generally Note, JudicialIntervention in
National Political Conventions: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 59 CORNELL L. Rv.107, 111-12
(1973).
41 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), established the "one man, one vote" concept
as a principle of constitutional law by requiring apportionment of seats in both houses of
state legislatures on the basis of population. Later cases extended this principle to local
elections. See Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (junior college district
election of trustee); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (county election).
The Court gave wide constitutional protection to the right to vote in Reynolds and
initiated the movement toward full recognition of voting as a fundamental interest: "Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in
state as well as in federal elections." 377 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added). The Court continued:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.
Id. at 561-62.
42 But see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (dictum that
voting too fundamental to be burdened by poll tax).
In San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Justice Powell stated
that the key to determining whether an asserted constitutional right is "fundamental" and
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qualifications denying an identifiable class of persons equal treatment in the electoral process have been overturned. 43 The Court's
thereby requires a compelling state interest to justify its infringement is whether or not the
right is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 33-34. In concluding
that the right to equality in public education is not fundamental, Justice Powell noted that
Dunn fully canvasses this Court's voting rights cases and explains that "this
Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionallyprotected right to participate
in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction." The constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process can no
longer be doubted even though, as the court noted in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, "the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned."
Id. at 34 n.74 (citations omitted).
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Rodriguez, agreed that "whatever degree of importance
has been attached to the state electoral process when unequally distributed, the right to vote
in state elections has itself never been accorded the stature of an independent constitutional
guarantee." Id. at 101. Justice Marshall, however, formulated a different test for determining what is a "fundamental interest," namely whether the right has unique status and value
in American society. He thus tied the right to vote in state elections directly to "basic civil and
political rights inherent in the First Amendment." Id. at 88-90.
43 Traditionally, the states have had wide latitude in fixing voter qualifications for all
elections. Justice Black summarized the constitutional authority of the states to set voter
qualifications:
It is obvious that the whole Constitution reserves to the States the power to set voter
qualifications in state and local elections, except to the limited extent that the people
through constitutional amendments have specifically narrowed the powers of the
States. Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen, Nineteen, and Twenty-four, each of which
has assumed that the States had general supervisory power over state elections, are
examples of express limitations on the power of the States to govern themselves.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125-26 (1970). Moreover, Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court in 1959, stated:
We do not suggest that any standards which a State desires to adopt may be
required of voters. But there is wide scope for exercise of its jurisdiction. Residence
requirements, age, previous criminal record are obvious examples indicating factors
which a State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications of
voters. The ability to read and write likewise has some relation to standards
designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot. Literacy and illiteracy are neutral
on race, creed, color, and sex, as reports around the world show.
Lassiter v. Northampton Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
But two years after Reynolds, Justice Douglas wrote the opinion holding a state-imposed
poll tax violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendement and noted:
[W]e must remember that the interest of the State, when it comes to voting, is
limited to the power to fix qualifications. Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not
germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). The equal protection clause
has also been held to invalidate state elections laws delineating certain residency or status
requirements. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (holding unconstitutional statute
requiring one year of residency in state and three months in county before qualifying to
vote); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (holding unconstitutional statute limiting
right to vote on revenue bond issues to property owners); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (holding unconstitutional statute requiring electors in school
board election to be parents or property owners); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)
(holding unconstitutional statute excluding armed services personnel from voting elsewhere
than in pre-military county of residence). But see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (property qualification valid in special purpose
district), noted in 59 CORNELL L R~v. 687 (1974). See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966) (federal voting rights act upheld, impliedly invalidating state literacy tests); Guinn v.
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position on state electoral regulation that merely interferes with
individual voting rights remains to be articulated.
The prisoners in O'Brien claimed more than mere interference
with their voting rights. They established that New York, by its
judicial construction of the absentee voting law and by the denial of
any alternative means by which to vote, had absolutely precluded
unconvicted detainees and imprisoned misdemeanants from
voting.4 4 The state did not disqualify theie detainees and misdemeanants as voters; instead, it barred them from exercising the
franchise. The distinction rests on the permanence of the disability.
While a disqualification is unlimited in time, a bar is temporary. For
example, a statute disqualifying all convicted felons from voting
operates indefinitely on the individual felon's voting rights. The
voting bar in O'Brien, on the other hand, focused on one point in
time: the prisoners were precluded from voting in a specific election occurring during the period of their incarceration. Although
total disqualification from voting may be the more serious limitation on the rights of a class, loss of the right to vote in one election
45
is not an insignificant deprivation.
The split of opinion in O'Brien offers little hope for clear
articulation of the constitutional status of the right to vote. The
opinion of the Court emphasized class discrimination as the constitutional violation while failing to elucidate the precise legal right
denied. 4 6 The dissenting Justices focused on the nature of the state
action challenged and implied that "minor" deprivations of the
right to vote, even if without justification, are not violative of the
Constitution. 47 Only the three concurring Justices expressly stated
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (discriminatory grandfather clause in state election law
violates fifteenth amendment).
The scope of the equal protection limitation on state voter qualifications since the
reapportionment cases has led one commentator to conclude that "[a]side from citizenship,
age and minimum residency requirements ... little else seems compelling. Hence, literacy
tests and denying the vote to convicted felons seem likely to fall." Kirby, supra note 38, at
1013. But see Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1048 (1968) (disqualification of felons held constitutional).
44 See Brief for Appellants at 14-16; notes 9-16 and accompanying text supra.
45 Denial of the right to vote in any election, whether federal, state, or local, is a serious
deprivation because elections occur only at substantial time intervals. For example, ballots
for President, Governor of New York, or Mayor of the City of New York are cast only once
every four years; for each United States Senator, only once every six years.
46 See notes 55, 60 & 61 and accompanying text infra.
47 Furthermore, this fallout from the New York statutes is minor and collateral and
not of great, let alone constitutional import. There is bound to be a dividing line
somewhere, intended or unintended (as I suspect this was). If that dividing line
operates to deprive a person of what he feels is his right to vote, his reaction will be
critical. Whether he has a constitutional claim, however, is something else again.
414 U.S. at 536 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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that when, without sufficient reason, a state prevents a class of
competent voters from exercising the right to vote, it violates the
Federal Constitution. 4 8 From these opinions one may conclude that
the Constitution implicitly provides an elusive right of a group to
"equal treatment in the voting process,' 49 but that ironically an
individual's right to vote in a specific election, a right which is often
assumed to exist, 0 is not protected by the Constitution.
This irregularity undoubtedly results from the expanding
case-by-case protection of the right to vote-not expressly mentioned in the Constitution-through the equal protection clause., 1
The Supreme Court's reluctance to establish an individual's constitutionally protected right to vote may be rationalized on the
[lit can no longer be contended that this case involves "merely a claimed right to
absentee ballots" and "not the right to vote," or that the challenged statutes "have
no direct impact on [appellants'] right to vote" . . . . [S]uch statements, in the
context of this case, fly in the face of reality. Nor can it be contended that denial of
absentee ballots to appellants does not deprive them of their right to vote any more
than it deprives others who may "similarly" find it "impracticable" to get to the polls
on election day . . . . [H]ere, it is the State which is both physically preventing
appellants from going to the polls and denying them alternative means of casting
their ballots. Denial of absentee registration and absentee ballots is effectively an
absolute denial of the franchise to these appellants.
Id. at 532-33 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall was responding to the conclusions of the New York Court of Appeals
and the brief of the State Attorney General. The New York Court of Appeals had stated:
The underlying right which is the subject of these proceedings is not the right
to vote, that right is independently guaranteed, but merely a claimed right to
absentee ballots, and, in some instances, absentee registration. And since [the
absentee] provisions have no direct impact on petitioners' right to vote, they need
only be reasonable in light of the scheme's purposes in order to be sustained.
31 N.Y.2d at 320, 291 N.E.2d at 136, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (citations and footnotes omitted).
In light of the fact that the prisoners were not allowed to vote, the court's reasoning is hard
to understand. On appeal, the appellants described the inconsistency as leaving them "with a
'right' that they cannot exercise and in no different position than if that 'right' had been
denied." Brief for Appellants at 15 n. 11; see Note, Election Laws as Legal Roadblocks to Voting,
55 IOWA L. REV. 616, 650 (1970).
The attorney general argued that O'Brien was distinguishable from Goosby because the
absentee voting statute in Goosby expressly excluded "persons confined in a penal institution." Brief for Attorney General of New York as Amicus Curiae at 10, O'Brien v. Skinner,
414 U.S. 524 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Attorney General]. Thus, although the
plight of the Goosby prisoners was analogous to that of disenfranchised convicted felons, he
considered the judicial instruction which exluded the prisoners in O'Brien distinguishable.
The prisoners in both O'Brien and Goosby, however, were absolutely precluded from
voting in at least one election by state action, although neither group was indefinitely
disqualified. The distinction noted by the Attorney General goes to the nature of the state
action, not the right denied. The New York absentee provisions, as construed by the New
York Court of Appeals and implemented by the state, are equivalent in effect to the express
statutory exclusion in Goosby.
" San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.74 (1973).
'0 See R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOcRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 370 (1967).
48

"' See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
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grounds of limiting "substantive" equal protection 52 or of judicial
53
conservatism in an area historically reserved to state legislatures.
Nonetheless O'Brien highlights the need for reconsideration of the
constitutional underpinnings of the right to vote in contemporary
4
American democracy..
2. Identification of the Class Subject to DiscriminatoryState Action

A fundamental principle of equal protection adjudication requires "definitive description of the classifying facts or delineation
of the disfavored class. ' 55 Classifications which are based on
.52However, the Burger Court's willingness to resurrect substantive due process by
reading a personal right of privacy into the fourteenth amendment (see, e.g.,-Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 167-71 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (state abortion statute violates due
process)) conflcts with such a justification.
'3 The Court might be concerned about inviting increased constitutional litigation in
the area of voting rights which affects millions of persons who are potential plaintiffs.
Proper separation of the judicial function from the legislative function is also a legitimate
concern for the Court, especially when it is faced with reviewing the detailed schemes of
state election laws. The Court might consider itself insufficiently familiar with the local needs
and complexities for which the particular legislation was adopted. It is questionable, however,
whether any of these concerns outweigh the Supreme Court's unique capacity to guarantee
individual civil rights. See note 83 infra.
54 Several Justices have suggested that the right to vote is implicit in the first amendment, but the proposition has never been directly adopted by a majority of the Court. See,
e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 38-40 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); San Antonio
Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 88-90 (1973) (Marshall, J.,dissenting). Beginning
with the famous dictum that the right to vote is a "fundamental political right, because
preservative of all rights" (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)), voting has been
characterized as both personal and political expression. This conclusion rests on two
propositions. First, in a democratic society each individual has an inalienable right to make
political choices and to express those choices by use of the ballot. See Kirby, supra note 38, at
1003-13. Second, voting is not an isolated individual undertaking; it becomes meaningful
only as a group activity. Because voting is political in nature, a spectrum of associational
rights is attached to an individual's political choices expressed by balloting. See Fortson v.
Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
Thus, the Supreme Court faces the task of securing majority rule while simultaneously
protecting the rights of minority groups. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(one-man, one-vote principle adopted), uith Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (poor
voters supporting particular candidate denied equal protection); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (exclusion of certain nonproperty holders from
school board elections held unconstitutional); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968)
(petition requirements for third party candidates overly burdensome); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966) (disenfranchised Puerto Rican community needs protection);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (exclusion of members of armed services from
elections held unconstitutional). See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 38-40 (1968)
(Douglas, J., concurring). See generally Note, The Emerging Right to Candidacyin State and Local
Elections: ConstitutionalProtection of the Voter, the Candidate,and the PoliticalGroup, 17 WAYNE L.
REv. 1543, 1555-56 (1971); 20 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 892, 904-05 (1969).
55 San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1973). Compare Justice
Stewart's formulation of "discrete and objectively identifiable classes" (id. at 60), with Justice
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race,5 6 alienage, 5 7 illegitimacy, 58 and sometimes wealth 59 require
close judicial scrutiny.
The common factor uniting all of the appellants in O'Brien was
their imprisonment. Additionally, three distinct subcategories
existed-those awaiting trial, those serving sentences as
misdemeanants, 60 and those confined in the county of their
residence. 61 The Chief Justice considered only the discrimination
against the last of these subcategories. He found New York's
apparent distinction between qualified voters confined within the
county of their residence and those confined outside the county of
their residence sufficiently arbitrary to dispose of the case on this
ground alone. 2 But the conclusion that New York allows persons
confined in prison outside the county of their residence to vote by
absentee means rests upon a tenuous statutory construction. 3 No
New York cases support this construction, but the Court accepted it
when counsel for Monroe County unwittingly conceded such a
64
construction at oral argument.
Thus the narrow ratio decidendi of the four-member plurality
is significant in three respects: (1) the precise precedential impact
of the holding is very limited; (2) narrow, tenuous distinctions
between even hypothetical categories may be persuasive; and (3)
this rationale allowed the Court to avoid the issue of discrimination
based upon wealth.
The O'Brien appellants had raised the issue of discrimination
based on wealth, contending that New York "erect[ed] an arbitrary
financial obstacle" to voting because detainees who were financially
unable to afford bail were prevented from voting in person or by
absentee ballot.6 5 Assuming that the offenses with which unconMarshall's view that "precise identification of the particular individuals who compose the
disadvantaged class" is not required. Id. at 93. See also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144
(1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
56 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
57 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
58 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
51 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
60 See Brief for Appellants at 25-26; Brief for Attorney General at 13.
61 The fact that all the appellants were Monroe County residents was never formally
proven, but was alleged in their verified complaint at trial and subsequently admitted. Brief
for Appellants at 7.
62 414 U.S. at 530.
63 Supposedly a prisoner confined outside the county of his residence is "unavoidably
absent from the county of his residence . . . because his duties, occupation or business
require him to be elsewhere on the day of election" within the scope of N.Y. ELECTION LAW
§§ 117(1)(b), 153(1) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
64 414 U.S. at 529 n.3.
65 Brief for Appellants at 25. As a matter of strategy, the appellants' counsel's decision
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victed detainees were charged were bailable offenses, 66 these detainees, if they were not financially disabled, would have had an
opportunity to vote equal to that of persons indicted and released
on bail. In essence, their contention was that the imposition of
monetary bail burdened their right to vote within the rationale of

68
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections67 and Bullock v. Carter.

The unconvicted detainees' claim could be met by at least two
arguments. First, the financial burdens in Harper (poll tax) and in
Bullock (candidate filing fees) were integral parts of the states'
election law schemes. 69 These wealth distinctions restricted the
electoral capacity of the poor as a class. In O'Brien, however, the
financial burden was a result of the criminal justice system as a
whole and was only incidentally related to voting. 70 Moreover,
state-imposed bail is limited only by the eighth amendment's requirement that bail not be excessive. 71 Second, the McDonald case is
authority for the proposition that an absentee voting law like New
York's does not create a discriminatory wealth classification. 72
The New York provisions as construed and applied by the
New York courts classified the appellants, both unconvicted detainees and imprisoned misdemeanants, primarily on the basis of
their confinement in a penal institution.73 In the case of convicted
misdemeanants, the record offered no indication of discrimination
to distinguish unconvicted detainees created a risk for the convicted misdemeanants because
it provided a basis for reversal as to unconvicted detainees alone.
66 The record gives no indication of the specific offenses with which the O'Brien
detainees were charged.
67 383 U.S. 663 (1966).

68 405 U.S. 134 (1972).

69 In Bullock, "poor voters" were allowed to vote, but the meaningfulness of their choice
was diluted because "poor candidates" for whom they supposedly desired to vote were
financially unable to gain access to the ballot. Id. at 144. Likewise the $1.50 poll tax
invalidated as a voter qualification in Harper did not absolutely bar anyone from voting but
merely placed an unreasonable financial burden upon exercise of the franchise. 383 U.S. at
668-70.
7 See 52 B.U.L. REv. 641, 644-47 (1972).
71 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Court has taken several steps to limit wealth discrimination among criminal defendants. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the Court held
that the equal protection clause precluded the states from requiring indigent criminal
defendants to pay for an appellate transcript when such a requirement effectively deprived
defendants of their right to an appeal granted by the state. Likewise, in Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court, applying the same rationale, established an
indigent's right to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal. See also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S.
395 (1971) (equal protection requires that statutory ceiling on imprisonment for any offense
be same irrespective of defendant's economic status). This rationale has not been extended
to bail determinations.
72 394 U.S. at 807-09 (1969) (absentee voting statute excluding prisoners does not
discriminate on basis of wealth).
73 31 N.Y.2d at 319, 291 N.E.2d at 136, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
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on the basis of wealth. 74 For unconvicted detainees unable to post
bail, the disability resulting from their poverty was only incidental
to their challenge to the absentee voting laws. 75 Consequently, even
though the' Court did not reach the issue of wealth discrimination,
it is doubtful that appellants' clair would have succeeded.
3. Identification of the State Action Subject toJudicialReview
The precise question on appeal in O'Brien v. Skinner was
whether the New York absentee voting statutes, as construed and
applied by the New York courts to exclude unconvicted detainees
and imprisoned misdemeanants from voting, violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.76 In distinguishing
McDonald, the appellants did state that they were in fact denied all
available means of voting.7 7 In framing the precise question appealed, however, they failed to emphasize that the state legislature
and state courts, as well as the local administrators, had combined
to preclude them from voting. Understandably, therefore, the
Court's opinion merely adopted the appellants' reference to the
unconstitutionality of the judicial construction of the absentee voting
statutes. 78 Implicit in the holding, however, is that the entire state
action involved, including the administrative denial of alternative
voting procedures, was unconstitutional.
74 It is conceivable, however, that a correlation could be established between persons
imprisoned for misdemeanors and their relative poverty. See H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW

HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 147-53 (3d ed. 1959). This fact alone, however, would probably
not adequately define a class for purposes of equal protection analysis. See note 66 and
accompanying text supra.
75 It is possible that an unconvicted detainee, able to provide bail and confined in
prison, but unable to vote because he chose not to post bail, would have the same equal
protection claim as a detainee financially unable to post bail-i.e., that his right to vote was
denied because of his penal status, rather than his financial status.
76 In reviewing the constitutionality of a state statute, the construction of the' statute
adopted by the state's highest court is generally conclusive in the United States Supreme
Court. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 369 (1964). Furthermore, the statute is tested in
light of its present purpose and effect. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lane
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). See also R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE

83-87 (1969).
The appellants also asserted that preclusion from voting because of state-imposed
confinement violates the due process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. Brief for
Appellants at 2. This issue was not litigated in the state courts and received no attention in
the Supreme Court.
'7 Brief for Appellants at 14.
78 414 U.S. at 530-31. Close analysis of the facts and rationale reveal, however, that the
Court held the statutes unconstitutional as construed and applied to these appellants.
The concurring Justices were more specific: "[I]t is the State which is both physically
preventing appellants from going to the polls and den)ing them alternativemeans of casting their
ballots." Id. at 533 (emphasis added).
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The dissenting Justices, persuaded by the New York Attorney
General's explanation of the concept of "remedial legislation,"
failed to perceive the scope and nature of the state action under
review.7 9 In his brief as amicus curiae, the Attorney General merely
analyzed the statutes on their face without considering the administrative and judicial denials of alternative means of voting.80 He
contended that because the statutes on their face were remedial in
nature, close judicial scrutiny was inappropriate. This argument
relies on a policy of judicial deference to legislation enacted to
remove existing inequities. New York's absentee voting laws were
designed to extend the capacity to vote to those who were previously unable to exercise that right. Therefore, the Attorney General argued, the judiciary should not invalidate such statutes under
the equal protection clause simply because the legislature decided
8' 1
not to correct "all evils at the same time.
As construed and applied in O'Brien, however, the relevant
sections of the New York election laws 8 2 were hardly remedial in
effect; instead they functioned through the state's administrative
and judicial bodies to deprive the appellants of their right to vote.
When fundamental personal rights are denied by the implementation of state statutes, the policy of judicial deference to remedial
legislation is inappropriate, 83 even if that legislation appears harm"' Id. at 535 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices followed the attorney
general's approach of reviewing the statutes on their face.
"OBrief for Attorney General at 11; see note 11 and accompanying text supra. An
attorney for Monroe County submitted respondent's brief and delivered oral argument, and
his position was essentially identical to that of the attorney general.
SI Brief for Attorney General at 11 (quoting Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608,
610 (1935)); cf. McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 810-11 (1969). For a
summary of the remedial effects of New York's absentee voting legislation, see Brief for
Attorney General at 3-5.
82 N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 117-a (McKinney 1964); id. § 153 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
83 The practice of judicial deference to remedial legislation originated in the economic
sphere. See, e.g., AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949) (state right-to-work
law, prohibiting discrimination against nonunion workers but not against union workers,
does not violate due process or equal protection); Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608,
610 (1934) (statute regulating advertising by dentists but not other professionals does not
violate equal protection). This concept entered the voting rights field by way of dicta in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966), which upheld § 4(e) of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1970)) as valid congressional action under the enabling
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The facts and question reviewed in O'Brien (see note 44
and accompanying text supra) are dearly distinguishable from those in Katzenbach. Likewise,
the other voting rights cases which have referred to the remedial legislation principle are
also distinguishable from O'Brien. See McDonald v..Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802 (1969)
(no showing that detainees were precluded from all means of voting); Fidell v. Board of
Elections, 343 F. Supp. 913 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 409 U.S. 972 (1972) (state's failure to include

1156

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1139

less on its face. Nevertheless, the remedial legislation concept
remains a potential obstacle to future litigants when the factual
record fails to demonstrate absolute denial of the right to vote to a
distinct category or when no express statutory classification is
present.
Identification of the precise state action under review also
affects the remedy which the state courts must fashion on
remand.8 4 If only the statutes had been reviewed, the Supreme
Court's holding would have required invalidation of the core of
New York's absentee voting system. 85 Less drastic relief is required
to remedy the unconstitutional construction and application of the
statutes in O'Brien, however, for the state courts, on remand, need
only order appropriate absentee voting or "in person" voting
procedures for unconvicted detainees and imprisoned misdemeanants.
temporarily absent voters within absentee voting statute for purpose of primary election held
unconstitutional).
Moreover, the fact that the statute under review is remedial in purpose, has apparently
never precluded application of a strict standard of review when fundamental rights have
been infringed. In fact, when a state selectively confers the right to vote, close judicial
scrutiny is required. Cf. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760 (1973); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969). The state action in O'Brien was analogous to
such selective distribution of the right to vote because the state selectively excluded unconvicted detainees and imprisoned misdemeanants from the voting process. Furthermore, the
policy of judicial deference to economic regulation is inappropriate where fundamental,
personal rights are involved. "Knowledge about civil and individual rights, unlike some
economic data, is neither so technical nor so esoteric as to lie beyond the legitimate
cognizance of the Court." Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 341, 373 (1949).

Thus, the principle of judicial deference to remedial legislation was inapplicable in
O'Brien for two reasons: (1) O'Brien is distinguishable factually and as a matter of law from
those voting rights cases in which the principle has been applied, and (2) historically, the
principle originally was enunciated in economic regulation cases and is inappropriate in
cases dealing with personal civil rights.
84 Because the Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970), disposition of the
appeal was governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970), which provides:
The Supreme Court ... may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any
judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and
may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree,
or order, or require such further proceedings to be-had as may be just under the
circumstances.
Id. Thus, although the Court had authority to formulate a decree for entry in state court, it
followed the usual practice of remanding for a further proceeding consistent with the
Court's opinion. 414 U.S. at 531; cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 310
(1964).
83 For a list of states having comparable absentee voting statutes, see jurisdictional
Statement for Petitioners, Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973).
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4. The State's Justificationfor Discriminatory Action
The general outline for judicial examination of a state's
justification for its discriminatory action under the compelling state
interest test had become fairly well settled prior to O'Brien. Two
inquiries were required: (1) whether the state's objectives were
legitimate, 86 and (2) whether the state's means were reasonably
necessary for the achievement of those -objectives. 7 Most equal
protection claims have hinged upon the application of these general principles. Not only did Chief Justice Burger ignore these tests
in O'Brien, he did not even consider what justification the state
might have had for its action in barring unconvicted detainees and
imprisoned misdemeanants from the right to vote. In this respect
the new standard, though extremely vague, is more stringent than
the rational relation test in which even hypothetical state interests
were sufficient justification for discriminatory classifications. 8 Absent a strikingly arbitrary discrimination between classes, such as
the "confined in the county of residence" distinction, the Court
may have to assess the state's justifications for its action to determine if it was arbitrary even under the Chief Justice's approach.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
Various formulations of this test have been applied. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51, 61 (1973) ("less drastic means"); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 353 (1972) ("least
restrictive means necessary"); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972) (means "reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives").
The appellants suggested a three-pronged test:
(1) the state's goals must be of compelling importance; (2) its means must be closely
related to those goals and may not unnecessarily burden or restrict the fundamental
right; and (3) the state's claim must involve an element of necessity, not mere
speculation about possible evils to which the classifications may be related.
Brief for Appellants at 13. It is difficult, however, to perceive the distinction between the
requirements of "compelling importance," "element of necessity," and no "unnecessary
burden."
88 See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). The Attorney General of New York maintained that the traditional standard of
reasonableness and rational relationship applied to remedial, absentee voting legislation.
Brief for Attorney General at 8-9. Thus, his brief offered the Court little assistance in
identifying the state's actual objectives and the appropriateness of the means used to attain
those objectives.
Furthermore, analysis by the Court of the state's interests is difficult for at least two
reasons. First, the purposes of state legislative or administrative action are seldom
documented or subject to proof by ordinary judicial techniques. The Justices must rely on
their own, and counsel's, logic and conjecture to identify the state's interests. Second,
assuming the state's interests can be identified, the Court must weigh and balance those
interests against competing private rights. Because of the precedential impact of constitutional decisions, that balance usually involves more than the limited facts of the case under
review.
86
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The precedents establish that the states have legitimate interests in assuring intelligent voting 89 and in preserving the integrity of the election process. 90 No contention that unconvicted
detainees or imprisoned misdemeanants are less knowledgeable
than other qualified voters was, or could be, offered in O'Brien.
The only possible justification for excluding the prisoners from
voting, therefore, lay in the state's interest in the integrity of the
election.
Undoubtedly, preventing electoral fraud and limiting disruption of orderly electoral procedures are the predominant legislative
purposes in requiring systematic "inperson" voting and selective
distribution of absentee voting privileges. 9 1 However, exclusion of
unconvicted detainees and imprisoned misdemeanants from absentee voting procedures or other alternative procedures is not necessary to guard against these dangers. There is no indication that
detainees or misdemeanants are more likely to engage in election
fraud than other qualified voters. 92 The hypothetical danger "that
without the protection of the voting booth, local officials might be
tempted to try to influence the local vote of in-county inmates" was
soundly rejected by the concurring Justices in O'Brien.'1 3 Moreover,
there is evidence that the distribution of absentee ballots to prisoners, the furnishing of paper ballots in prison, and the use of mobile
"9See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
90 See, e.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761-62 (1973).
"

See Note, supra note 48, at 650-51.

92 New York has disqualified only convicted felons from exercising the franchise. N.Y.
ELECTION LAW § 152(2) (McKinney Supp. 1974). Penal confinement deprives a prisoner of

no rights, including the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, which are not "expressly,
or by necessary implication, taken from him by law." Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445
(6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945); see Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327
(M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (racial segregation in jail unconstitutional). See also Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972)
(right to receive and transmit mail). In the case of unconvicted detainees, it is clear that
confinement serves only to assure the presence of the accused at trial. See Jones v.
Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 100 aff'd on rehearingon another issue, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D.
Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). See also
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138-40 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Hamilton v. Love, 328
F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971). See geqerally authorities cited note 8 supra.
"3 It is hard to conceive how the State can possibly justify denying any person his
right to vote on the ground that his vote might afford a state official the opportunity to abuse his position of authority. If New York truly has so little confidence in
the integrity of its state officers, the time has come for the State to adopt stringent
measures to prevent official misconduct, not to further penalize its citizens by
depriving them of their right to vote. There are surely less burdensome means to
protect inmate voters against attempts to influence their votes . ...
414 U.S. at 534 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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registration units do not unduly burden or disrupt the electoral
process. 94 Any mere administrative inconvenience in implementing
such programs is insufficient to justify the absolute denial of the
right of prisoners to vote. 95
CONCLUSION

When a majority of a court cannot agree on the rationale for a
decision, the significance of that decision is difficult to gauge. The
sharp split of opinion in O'Brien v. Skinner presents this problem. A
few points are clear, however. The Burger Court has retreated
from the sweeping equal protection analysis of the Warren Court
precedents in the voting rights field.96 Characterization of the right
to vote as a fundamental interest, constitutionally protected by the
fourteenth amendment, has been abandoned. The compelling state
interest standard for close judicial scrutiny of state election laws
which limit access to voting apparently has been replaced with a
more flexible but undefined standard of "arbitrariness."
Ironically, the present Court jettisoned the prior mode of
analysis while upholding the right of unconvicted detainees and
imprisoned misdemeanants to vote by absentee or other special
" The New York Court of Appeals rejected specialized voting procedures for the
penally confined because of "attendant difficulties" and "like hazards" but did not identify
these difficulties. See note 15 supra.
At least three factors support the conclusion that the state could distribute absentee
ballots or develop alternative voting procedures for appellants without unduly disrupting the
electoral process or increasing the risk of electoral fraud. First, "branch" or "mobile
registration" units are used extensively and manned by volunteers for nonprison voters in
New York. See Bishop v. Lomenzo, 350 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Second, at least some
prison personnel are prepared and willing to assist in providing special "in prison" voting
procedures. See Brief for Appellants at 6 n.7 (Monroe County Sheriffs desire to cooperate
rioted). Third, New York election officials already maintain staffs and procedures to process
absentee balloting forms for two classes of persons: (1) qualified voters and their spouses,
parents, and children who are unavoidably absent from the county of their residence
because of duties, business, occupation, vacation, or confinement in a veteran's hospital (N.Y.
ELECTION LAW § 117 (McKinney Supp. 1974)); and (2) qualified voters unable to vote in
person because of illness or physical disability (id. § 117-a). See Love v. Hughes, Civil No.
72-1081 (N.D. Ohio, filed Oct. 27, 1972) (distribution of paper ballots to pretrial detainees).
"5 See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
96 Clearly, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, dissenting in O'Brien, oppose the "compelling state interest" approach. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart have also expressed disapproval of this standard of review. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395
U.S. 621, 634-41 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting); notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
Justice White has never articulated a preference but appears to follow Chief Justice Burger's
approach. Despite his dissent in Rosario v. Rockefeller, Justice Powell apparently followed
Chief Justice Burger and the Rosario rationale in O'Brien. Only Justices Brennan, Douglas,
and Marshall clearly continue to support the Warren Court's approach.

1160

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

procedures. To do so, Chief Justice Burger based the Court's
decision on an extremely narrow ground-the minor, and probably
fictitious, difference in treatment between those prisoners confined
97
within and those confined without the county of their residence.
The factual pattern in O'Brien also provides a basis for distinguishing its holding in future cases. The state had absolutely barred the
prisoners from voting; their deprivation could not reasonably be
attributed to their own action. Furthermore, the challenged state
action involved more than a legislative determination; administrative and judicial refusals of alternative voting procedures added
strength to the prisoners' claim.
Thus, although the precise holding of O'Brien will probably
have little direct impact on future voting rights cases, the case is
significant as an indication of a major shift in the Court's position
on equal protection challenges to electoral laws that limit access to
the ballot. In the future, an individual or group may have to prove
more than denial of the right to vote in a single election in order to
invalidate state-imposed infringement of voting rights.
Thomas E. Myers
97 This narrow distinction precludes viewing O'Brien as a case removing the inequities of
imprisonment generally. Cf. note 8 supra.

